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The Tennessee River system begins on the worn magnificent
crests of the Southern Appalachians, among the earth 's older
mountains, and the Tennessee River shapes its valley into the
form of a boomerang, bowing to its sweep through seven
states. Near Knoxville the streams still fresh from the
mountains are linked and thence the master stream spreads
the valley most richly southward, swims past Chattanooga
and bends down into Alabama to roar like blown smoke
through the flood-gates of Wilson Dam , to slide becalmed
along the crop-cleansed fields of Shiloh, to march due north
across the high diminished plains of Tennessee and through
Kentucky spreading marshes toward the valley's end where,
finally , at the toes of Paducah, in one wide glassy swarm the
water stops forward and continuously dies into the Ohio .
So wrote James Agee in a 1933 Fortune magazine article on the
Tennessee Valley Authority. Through the poetic economy of a
single paragraph, Agee summed up the river's scenographic
richness as well as its powerful topography. However, it will take
more than one paragraph to sum up T.V.A.'s importance as a
paradigm and the lessons its evolution offers; for the paradigm has
been made more complex over time and its lessons are many and
varied. 1
Power-in various guises and at many levels-is at the heart of
the T.V.A. Most obvious is the fact that T.V.A. owes its
conception to the unharnessed power of falling water. This
potential energy could, through the use of dams and turbines,
generate hydroelectricity, the power of Nature harnessed. There is,
also, the political power necessary to overcome the myriad
jurisdictions encompassed within the river basin's 41,000
square-mile area that includes portions of the following seven
states: Alabama, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina,
Virginia, and Tennessee. Then, too, there is the military and
agricultural power of the nitrates to be manufactured by means of
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the generated electrical energy. On the one hand, it is the power
of destruction; on the other, it is the power of life. Lastly, there is
the power of an idea, in this case the belief that government's
proper function is to work for and with the governed to improve
the quality of their individual and collective existence, an idea
articulated in both the Declaration of Independence and the United
States Constitution . It is important to remember this last point, the
nature and function of government, because it rests on T .V.A.'s
legality. From these same documents derives the argument for
T.V.A.'s existence as articulated by Sen. George Norris (1861-1944)
of Nebraska 2 •
At this point, at least two questions come to mind : first, what
was it that sparked in Norris the idea that the Federal Government
should undertake a project of such magnitude as the management
of the resources of an entire river watershed? And, what was there
in Norris's background, if anything, that would suggest such an
unprecedented approach (in this country) to problem solving as the
marshalling of the resources of an entire nation for the benefit of a
particular region of the country?
By way of background, it should be noted that prior to the end
of the First World War, the United State government had invested
over 100 million dollars at Muscle Shoals, Alabama, on the
Tennessee River, to develop facilities for the manufacture of
nitrates for munitions, production of which, because of the high
temperatures involved, require large quantities of inexpensive
electric power. None of these undertakings had been completed
when the war ended. With the advent of peace, further
construction was (and is) dominated by agriculture, Norris was
well aware of another use to which nitrates might be putfertilizers for farming. 3
By extrapolation, Norris was innately sympathetic to the
conditions facing farmers in the Tennessee River Valley, where
ignorance resulted in the deconsecration of the soil, the breaking of
the covenant man annually makes with Nature, in declining
productivity, in erosion, and in deforestation. The result of all of
this was a poverty whose impact was both pernicious and
pervasive, one that produced a canker on the landscape: an affront
to the eye as well as the soul of mankind . The same situation also
offered the potential for enlightened intervention.
To Norris, the previous actions of the Federal Government at
Muscle Shoals demonstrated a willingness to approach the solution
34

THE KENTUCKY REVIEW

is
re

ted
the

~44)

:it

tent
nt
1ere
the
of a
end
ted

h

of problems whose importance was militarily strategic. These same
resources, these same energies, this same force of will might also
be applied to improve the quality of life for the residents of this
impoverished area of the country. As a result, the enabling
legislation for T .V.A. included three major points: flood control,
navigation, and production and marketing of electric power above
and beyond that used in the production of nitrates. The key to the
success of this enterprise was construction of a series of dams and
locks along the river. The dams and locks would control flooding
and stabilize the river's depth for navigation. Constructed with
turbines, these same dams would generate lar-ge amounts of
(relatively) inexpensive electricity that could be distributed to rural
and farming families . In short, the Federal Government would
accomplish what the private sector of the economy had been
unwilling or unable to attempt. In addition, many people could be
put back to work, a most attractive prospect with the economy
lethargic, staggering (in 1933) under unprecedented unemployment
and poverty.
As chair of the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Norris
worked long and hard to convince Franklin Delano Roosevelt to
make the use of Muscle Shoals part of the strategy in his 1932
campaign for the presidency. As a result, shortly after his
inauguration, President Roosevelt sent the following letter to
Congress recommending creation of the Tennessee Valley
Authority:
The continued idleness of a great national investment in the
Tennessee Valley leads me to ask the Congress for legislation
necessary to enlist this project in the service of the people.
It is clear that the Muscle Shoals development is but a
small part of the potential public usefulness of the entire
Tennessee River . Such use, if envisioned in its entirety,
transcends more power development: it enters the wide fields
of flood control, soil erosion, afforestation, elimination from
agricultural use of marginal lands, and distribution and
diversification of industry. In short, this power development
of war days leads logically to national planning for a
complete river watershed involving many States and the
future lives and and welfare of millions. It touches and gives
life to all forms of human concerns.
I, therefore, suggest to the Congress legislation to create a
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Tennessee Valley Authority-a corporation clothed with the
power of government but possessed of the flexibility and
initiative of a private enterprise. It should be charged with
the broadest duty of planning for the proper use,
conservation, and development of the natural resources of the
Tennessee River drainage basin and its adjoining territory for
the general social and economic welfare of the Nation. This
authority should also be clothed with the necessary power to
carry these plans into effect. Its duty should be the
rehabilitation of the Muscle Shoals development and the
coordination of it with the wider plan.
Many hard lessons have taught us the human waste that
results from lack of planning. Here and there a few wise
cities and counties have looked ahead and planned. But our
Nation has "just grown." It is time to extend planning to a
wider field, in this instance comprehending in one great
project many States directly concerned with the basin of one
of our greatest rivers.
This in a true sense is a return to the spirit and vision of
the pioneer. If we are successful here we can march on, step
by step, in a like development of other great natural
territorial units within our borders.
The White House, April 10, 1933
That the country was in the throes of the Great Depression did
not hinder Norris's (or Roosevelt's) chances of success. On many
fronts, there were those who believed that capitalism was dead,
democratic government impotent, revolution inevitable. With a
few others, including the president, Norris's outlook was more
sanguine. He believed in the essential strength and rightness of
government, in the moral imperatives contained in the preamble to
the Constitution where the reasons for establishing government
were enumerated as follows:
... to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure
domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense,
promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of
liberty to ourselves and posterity. . . .
The traumatized state of the economy in 1933 demanded
innovation and action at an unprecedented scale, in unprecedented
36 THE KENTUCKY REVIEW
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ways. A creative and inclusive approach to problem solving at all
levels was required, and responsibility for such action had been
mandated by the people through the Constitution. Politicians had
only to use this power. Roosevelt and Norris acted at once. For
the president, the legislation giving rise to T.V.A. would create
jobs and put people to work on something of lasting value to the
nation. Further, as work progressed, T.V.A.'s highly visible
accomplishments would renew the general faith in the government
ability to act "to insure domestic tranquility" and "promote the
general welfare." Whether Norris or Roosevelt understood it as
such, T.V.A. became a means whereby democracy might be
preserved in this country, and the first directors seen as keepers of
this flame.
Whether inspired or calculated, President Roosevelt's decision
to appoint a civil engineer (Arthur E. Morgan, 1878-1975) 4, a
lawyer (David Lilienthal, 1899-1981)5 , and an educator (John
Harcourt Alexander Morgan, 1867-1950) 6 was fortunate. Their
collective education combined agriculture, civil engineering, and
law. They were all reform-minded, open to explore new solutions
to old problems, able to see possibilities for action where none
appeared to exist. Finally, they spoke the language of those whom
they were empowered to serve, i.e., the region's populace, or to
direct, the requisite bureaucracy of architects, engineers, landscape
architects, agronomists, conservationists, archaeologists, and
others. Existing conditions and the times demanded that the board
of directors interpret their task as broadly as possible; and while
never explicitly described as such, theirs became a model of the
holistic approach to problem solving. 7
The term holistic was essentially unfamiliar to T.V.A.'s
professional staff. For the most part, the individuals assembled to
fulfill T.V.A.'s mandate were engineers, pragmatists all, for whom
the function of thought was to guide action, for whom truth was
preeminently to be tested by the practical consequences of
application. In fewer numbers were architects and planners to
whom responsibility fell to give physical form and spiritual
expression to what were-or might have remained-essentially
pragmatic solutions. The work and influence of two individuals,
the architect Roland Wank (1898-1970) and the regional planner
Benton MacKaye (1879-1975), can be seen to manifest this shift
from simple pragmatism to a higher (spiritual) expression; to
personify the holistic approach to problem solving at all levels
37 SPAETH

within T.V.A.; and to be enjoined from producing architectural or
planning solutions that served or employed merely decorative or
ornamental ends.
Wank was born and grew up in Europe. He was educated at the
Academy of Beaux-Arts in Budapest and the Royal Technical
University in Bruno, Czechoslovakia. He came under the pervasive
influence of Otto Wagner (1841-1918), one of the most important
architects in the Austro-Hungarian empire. Through his own work,
as well as his numerous publications, Wagner encouraged his
students to develop a "modern" expression for new as well as
existing building types, now greatly influenced by the full impact
of the Industrial Revolution. In the final analysis, however, Wank
was more directly influenced, it would seem, by the work of
Wagner's students than by Wagner himself.B
Just as T.V.A.'s architectural expression is rooted in European
Modernism, the same case can be made for its approach to
planning. Late in the nineteenth century and very early in the
twentieth, the idea of regional planning is anticipated in the work
of at least three Europeans: Arturo Soria y Mata (1844-1920) of
Spain, Ebenezer Howard (1850-1928) of Great Britain, and Tony
Garnier (1869-1949) of France . Contained within their respective
works, Soria, Howard, and Garnier articulated the essential
intellectual framework and national imperative for an approach to
planning transcending both local boundaries, in Howard and
Garnier's case, and national boundaries, in Soria's. Independently,
and to differing degrees, their work recognized the importance
technology and industrialization would have in the determination
of regional growth and form. 9
In this country, an equally important development directly
relating to activities in Europe propelled planning to the conceptual
scale of the region. The Regional Planning Association was
founded in New York in 1923; it was, as one author has described
it, "an informal clearing house for new thinking, which incubated
many of the land-reclamation and social-development policies later
put into effect by the New Deal, such as flood control, rural
electrification, and reforestation of logged-over mountain tracts by
the Civilian Conservation Corps." Benton MacKaye, a regional
planner by intention as well as by instinct, was an early and
important member of this association whose ranks also included
the urban critic and historian Lewis Mumford .
More than a decade before MacKaye became associated with
38
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T .V.A. , in the Journal of the American Institute of Architects, he
proposed a footpath to run the length of the Appalachian
Mountains. Contained in this deceptively simple proposal
(published in 1921) were his ideas concerning the necessity for
regional planning, for thinking about problems at a scale that
precluded political boundaries. In 1928, he published his most
important work, The New Ex ploration, in which he presented a
most compelling argument for regional planning. Corning as
MacKaye's work does just prior to the Great Depression, it
anticipates certain changes in attitude toward land development
and the role government might play in the preservation and
development of the environrnent. 10
In retrospect, it seems both fortuitous and logical that MacKaye.
should be appointed regional planner for the T.V.A. (1934-1936)
and that he would hold a similar position in the Rural
Electrification Administration (R .E.A.) . His analogies in The New
Exploration examined the "wilderness of industrialization" as if it
were a terra incognita and applied the same rigorous analysis to its
understanding as one would to understanding the ecological
balance of a watershed, a forest , or a wetlands. This is due, in
part, to his education in forestry and his work for the Forestry
Service; and partly it is due to his ability to apply the scientific
method to different but related situations. In short, MacKaye was
predisposed to thinking about large-scale problems, seeking a
pattern or order that related parts to the whole and vice versa,
and discovering, or leading out, a physical structure to
environmental problems, one capable of solving more problems
than it created in its solution.
The approach to solving problems as evolved.by T .V.A. was
predicated equally on necessity and logic. Darns were located
where conditions were most favorable, where physical geography
permitted, where the most electricity could be generated, and
where raw materials were most conveniently available. What
resulted was a careful balancing and integration of many more
factors influencing design than simply function or the allowable
compressive strength of reinforced concrete. What emerged was a
symbiotic relationship between parts and the whole, the only
enlightened way to approach the solution of problems at this
scale. 11
The legacy of Wank and the architects and engineers who
worked with him is a highly visible one. Darns and locks were
39 SPAETH

constructed; the river gradually became navigable and flooding less
and less a problem; in a few cases, workers formed the nucleus of
communities that exist today. Less obvious, though no less
profound, is MacKaye's impact as . well as that of the planners,
foresters, and landscape architects with whom he worked. We
cannot see what was; we see only what is: Badly eroded hillsides
are now covered with mature stands of timber; muddy streams are
clear; fertility has been returned to the soil; an imperceptible
restoration of the landscape has replaced the scars and desecration.
Too quickly, though, both from within and from without, T.V.A.
became engaged in a struggle for power, for primacy over areas of
responsibility, for autonomy with a Congress that now feared it
had created a bureaucratic monster, responsible to no power but
its own, and the balance of necessary purpose and idealism,
characteristics of T.V.A.'s original intention, gave way to
bureaucratic ennui, or worse, to petty infighting. Born of social
necessity and inspired moral suasion, T.V.A.'s history mirrors the
changing national will, the movement from populist idealism and
intervention to sustaining or maintaining the status quo.
Were one to single out the day external forces moved to expand
T.V.A.'s mission beyond the limits governing the actions of its
directors, it would be 2 December 1942. On that date in Chicago,
a sustained, controlled nuclear reaction was achieved. In
retrospect, we can see just how powerful a force this was; and
T.V.A. provided the necessary and virtually unlimited electrical
energy to manufacture the first A-bomb. While it is true that
munitions production was one of the reasons T.V.A. came into
being, the atom bomb went well beyond what had been envisioned
in the enabling legislation. T.V.A., along with other national
resources like industry, manufacturing, and agriculture, joined the
war effort. It was a military necessity, and it was socially
appropriate: the creation of T.V.A. had helped save the nation
from political anarchy during the Great Depression. Now its
energy and nitrate production, as well as its demonstrated capacity
for problem solving with efficiency and elan, were pressed into
preserving the world for democracy.
Having helped release nuclear energy, after the Second World
War it was relatively easy for T.V.A. to provide even more
electrical power with nuclear reactors, the now well-dammed
Tennessee River providing a reliable water supply for cooling the
reactors and generating steam from the turbines. However,
40 THE KENTUCKY REVIEW
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T.V.A.'s costly-in many ways and at many levels-dalliance with
nuclear power, reflects a national infatuation with an escalating
standard of living, continuation of which was predicated on two
fantasies:
-that electric power will always be available in unlimited
and inexpensive quantities;
-and that technology will never be misused or applied
beyond appropriate limits.
The fantasy of unlimited and inexpensive electrical energy was
abetted by the private power industry, including manufacturers of
electrical equipment, whose prophecies of power consumption
doubling every decade were largely self-fulfilling. Further, use of
electricity was encouraged by the discounted rate given to "allelectric" homes. Such a marketing strategy ignored the efficiency
and cost-effectiveness of other energy sources and placed an
unrealistic premium on the marketed "convenience" and
"cleanliness" of electricity. The second fantasy, that of an always
sensible use of technology, is based on a misreading of human
hahavior. Technology has been and will continue to be employed
for good and evil, both terms being absolute rather than relative.
It is important that we remember that morality resides not in
technology itself but in the ends to which technology is put, as
well as the limits within which technology can be said to operate
effectively and appropriately.
These two conditions, effectiveness and appropriateness, are the
sticking points in any analysis. They raise two questions. First, is
it possible to evaluate whether or not a solution is effective prior
to implementation-especially if it is a new idea or a new
application of an existing idea? And, second, on what basis is
appropriateness to be determined? Judged? Evaluated?
However convinced we may be of the essential "rightness" of
T .V.A.'s holistic problem-solving approach, one reservation
manifests itself. To accept this approach is to accept that it is
entirely appropriate for mankind to attempt to drastically reshape
the physical environment and to do so for long periods of time.
The logical corollary to this assumption is that it is possible for
mankind to predict (as well as understand) the consequences, both
logical and otherwise, of our interventions into Nature's realm.
Even with the use of highly sophisticated computer-generated
41 SPAETH

models, we remain unconvinced of this "truth. " Alas, to harbor
such doubts is to call into question T.V.A. 's efficacy as well as the
efficacy of any organization charged with undertaking large-scale
changes in the environment.
We must, unquestionably, correct environmental ills and protect
property. We should, however, assume a more modest stance
relative to our expectations and a more inclusive view of the scope
of each design problem. The "can do" attitude that saw completion
of the Panama Canal and other feats of twentieth-century
construction and engineering does not go far enough, nor does it
embrace enough factors in its problem statement. Nevertheless, the
current governmental requirement that an analysis be made of the
environmental impact of a specific project is a welcome and useful
step; but it, too, assumes an ability to predict the full
consequences of a proposed solution. It assumes that natural
conditions are static. They are not. They are dynamic, taking
place over very long periods of time, much longer than we can
comprehend. Because of this, we human beings will always have a
distorted perspective of history and mankind's impact on it. This
brings us to the first of T.V.A. 's lessons . As Bill McKibben
observed in a recent New Yorker article :
Changes in our world which can affect us can (and do)
happen in our lifetime-not just changes like wars, but bigger
and more sweeping events. Without recognizing it, we have
already stepped over the threshold of such a change . I believe
we are at the end of nature ... [and by nature] I mean a
certain set of human ideas about the world and our place in
it. But the death of these ideas begins with concrete changes
in the reality around us . More and more frequently, these
changes will clash with our perceptions, until our sense of
nature as external and separate is finally washed away and
we see all too clearly what we have done.
Seeing clearly also implies that we understand the "tools"
employed to bring about change . One such tool is bureaucracy.
What we now understand about all bureaucracies is that once
created and implemented, they tend to assume an independent
existence. Having realized intended goals, they seek continuance.
In fact, at the very moment of achievement, of realization of their
intended purpose, they should go out of existence; or at the very
42 THE KENTUCKY REVIEW
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least, they should be examined relative to function and
reconstituted for a new purpose. Had such a requirement been
followed, quite possiblity T.V.A. could have avoided the ill-starred
course that resulted in its attempts to generate electric power from
nuclear energy, the now largely abandoned reactors of which serve
as hulking reminders of mankind's hubris and a bureaucracy
existing beyond its conceptual limits.U
But why was this not allowed to happen? By the mid-1950s,
twenty years after its birth, having fulfilled its mission, T.V.A.
was looking for new challenges; nuclear-generated electric power
was that challenge as was its almost equally short-lived interest in
passive and active solar heating systems. T.V.A.'s large
engineering staff needed such projects to occupy time and justify
existence. Divestiture of responsibility for resource management
and power generation and distribution was not considered, nor
was transforming T .V.A. into a proactive research and
development arm of the Federal Government. Had this occurred,
the newly created agency might have taken the position of offering
at a larger scale what had been provided to residents of the
Tennessee River Valley-a demonstrated capacity to solve
problems holistically; a better reasoned, integrated balance of
needs and natural limits applied to a wide-ranging set of
environmental and technological problems.
Rather than expending energy to stem the inevitable
obsolescence of its infrastructure, taking the bold step of reforming itself would place T.V.A. and its problem-solving
methodology in ready anticipation of the twenty-first century.
T.V.A.'s experience offers the mechanisms whereby this
transformation might be accomplished along with recognition of
the inherent limits governing such undertakings. To do so would
be, as President Roosevelt pointed out in his original message to
Congress, a "return to the spirit and vision of the pioneer," for "if
we are successful here we can march on, step by step, in a like
development of other great natural territorial units within our
borders." As Kentucky's Wendell Berry points out in A Vision,
however, 'This is no paradisal dream. Its hardship is its
possibility."
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NOTES
1In my attempt to understand T.V.A .'s value as a problem-solving
model, I received insight from what would appear to have been an
unlikely source, a German emigre and teacher for whom I acted as a sort
of chauffeur while a graduate student. Whereas I had been led to believe
that T .V.A. represented simply an attack on free enterprise, Ludwig
Hilberseimer, my teacher, suggested that it was an excellent example of
planning undertaken at a scale large enough to have had real impact and
lasting value, that the T.V.A . model is capable of application elsewhere.
Only later would I learn that the needs of Hilberseimer's appreciation
for this approach to problem-solving-at a regional scale-could be found
in his European work from the mid-to-late 1920s when he directed
planning studies while a member of the Bauhaus faculty . Here he studied
urban problems, not in isolation, but as part of a greater whole . As my
conversations with him made painfully clear, my ignorance or prejudiceone and the same-limited my ability to see a "thing" for what it truly
was rather than as a part of the conventional wisdom I had inherited .
While I may not always have lived up to it, this "power of the intellect" is
one lesson I have not forgotten.
2
Norris, a Republican by party affiliation, an independent-populist by
moral persuasion, shepherded the enabling legislation through Congress,
when it benefited his electoral constituency only very indirectly, if at all.
3 Having come from midwestern farming stock, Norris's outlook on life
embodied the values of those people, i.e ., the importance of hard work,
the virtue of education, and the necessity to carefully and intelligently
husband all resources . Further, Nebraska's light and unpredictable annual
rainfall drove home to him the importance of the sensible management of
this most necessary resource: water. Files of his correspondence are full of
constituents' requests for help in constructing water-retention basins for
irrigation; and having known hardship and tragedy at an early age (both
his father and his only brother were dead long before Norris reached his
maturity), as a youth he became the chief support of his family, acutely
aware of the plight of the poor, of the farmer's dependence on the
caprices of nature.
4
0f T.V.A.'s first directors, the educational background and
professional experience of Arthur E. Morgan (1878-1975) most clearly
suited the responsibilities with which the authority was charged. Under his
father's direction, Morgan received his professional training as a civil
engineer. After five years of independent practice, in 1907, at the request
of the Federal Government, he undertook a series of drainage
investigations resulting in a reclamation project for Arkansas's St. Francis
River. Similar reclamation projects were undertaken by him in several
Gulf states. From 1910 to 1933, he was president of Morgan Engineering,
until 1915 located in Memphis, Tennessee, and later in Dayton, Ohio,
where after the Dayton flood of 1913, Morgan was largely occupied with
designing methods of water control and flood prevention . This was the
first project of its type in the United States to employ dams and other
water-retention structures for flood control.
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Although major water reclamation projects were to be the focus of
much of his professional life, Morgan also had an abiding interest in
higher education. From 1920 to 1936, he served as president of Antioch
College, Yellow Springs, Ohio, where his abilities to think and act
creatively were tested in a different venue . In 1933, President Roosevelt
appointed Morgan to serve as T.V.A.'s first chairman, a position he
occupied until 1938. In this capacity and in cooperation with constituted
national, state, and local authorities, Morgan supervised the organization
and partial execution of a unified physical, economic, and social
development program for the Tennessee River basin .
5 Educated as an attorney, David Lilienthal (1899-1981) began to
practice law in Chicago in 1923, shortly after he was admitted to the
Illinois bar. From 1926 to 1931, he was special counsel in utility matters
to the city of Chicago. His work attracted the attention of Philip
LaFollette, then governor of Wisconsin, who requested that Lilienthal
reorganize that state's Railroad Commission. As a public service
commissioner, Lilienthal undertook the complete revision of the public
utilities statutes. After enactment, these served as a model for similar
legislative reform in other states . In 1933, President Roosevelt appointed
Lilienthal one of the three original directors of the Tennessee Valley
Authority. When his three-year term was over in 1936, he was
reappointed to a nine-year term. Pres. Harry Truman appointed him to an
additional nine-year term commencing in 1945; and from 1941 to 1946 he
was the third chairman of its board of directors.
Shortly before he assumed the chairmanship, the farsighted Lilienthal
delivered a speech at the University of California, Berkeley, in which he
argued that :
Time may prove that the greatest value of the T.V.A. to the Nation
is as a workable way to avoid the dangers of remote and
overcentralized government, as a method of bringing the National
Government closer to the people and their regions of America, to
give them a greater voice in their National Government.
As an example of the "decentralized administration of centralized
authority" of which he spoke, Lilienthal argued that T.V.A. was a public
enterprise, operated on business principles, free of undue political
influence and patronage. The Authority's Congressional critics, however,
wanted T.V.A. to pay to the general treasury its annual revenues
($40,000,000 in 1945), thereby depriving T.V.A. of its ability to function
outside direct Congressional control. subjecting its operations, through
appropriations, to Congressional review and approval. Had this been
accomplished, T.V.A.'s architects, engineers, and planners would have
been forced to give political consideration to technical problems such as
the location of dams. Lilienthal worked to see that this did not happen.
T.V.A. was kept above politics-insofar as that is possible in a democracy
such as ours .
6
No relation to Arthur Morgan, John Harcourt Alexander Morgan
(1867-1950), the third director, brought to T.V.A. background and
45 SPAETH

experience quite different from that of his fellow first directors . Educated
in agriculture as an entomologist, in 1889 he was appointed professor of
entomology and horticulture at Louisiana State University. In 1905 he
moved to Tennessee, becoming professor of zoology and entomology at
the University of Tennessee and director of its agricultural experiment
station. After 1913, he served as dean of the College of Agriculture; and,
in 1919, he was appointed president of the university, a position he held
until 1933, when he was appointed to the board of directors of the
Tennessee Valley Authority . He succeeded Arthur E. Morgan as second
chairman of the Authority in 1938.
7Holistic can be taken here to mean the discovery and application of
the comprehensive and mutually dependent relationship between parts and
wholes. As a problem-solving approach, it is both structural and
attitudinal, capable of manifesting itself as an effective and inclusive
means of physical expression .
8 While it is true that much of Wagner's students' work was inspired by
the curvilinear lines and forms of the Vienna Secession, in other examples
there is a proto-modern quality to their design proposals, an aesthetic
inspired by the machine and the use of smooth, relatively unadorned
surfaces and simple forms. Two student projects reveal this as well as
Wank's ability to synthesize and assimilate the work of others. An
untitled sketch, possibly for a memorial, by Josef Plecnik, dated 1899,
evokes the synthesis of material and structure characteristic of engineering
structures built by the Romans. While Plecnik's sketch does not indicate
specific materials, the drawing implies a visually simple construction of
arches, battered walls, and piers, all evocative of the plastic and
monolithic qualities of in situ-reinforced concrete, or of a heavy stone
masonry . It is the simple architectonic vocabulary used by Wank and his
associated architects and engineers at T.V.A. in the design of Norris as
well as other dams .
Another drawing, this one by Mariz Balzarek, dated 1902, for a
"Spartan Lodge," a sports complex with a field house, bears striking
resemblance to the Union Station railroad terminal, Cincinnati, Ohio
(1929-1933), on which Wank worked, having immigrated to the. United
States in 1924. To span the field house, Balzarek appears to have
proposed using a three-hinged arch; and in the end elevation, the space
below the arch is subdivided by heavy mullions as is the case with Wank's
railroad station. Wank's solution for the principal elevation of Union
Station is similar, but there is an important difference between the two
structures: Wank's is a semi-dome, the longitudinal section of which is an
arch and clearly represented as such in the principal elevation. Balzarek's
structure is, presumably, a series of arches arranged to enclose a space
longer in one dimension than the other, the spatial typology of a barrel
vault. With its extensive trackage and complicated, but well-resolved,
circulation, Cincinnati's was the last major railroad terminal constructed in
the United States. It was then, and remains, an important modern
building. Quite possibly, Wank owed his appointment as T .V.A.'s chief
architect to his role in the terminal's design as well as his demonstrated
ability to effectively manage and resolve complex architectural and
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planning problems and his ability to synthesize and incorporate the best of
the work of others.
For more background on Wank, see Marian Moffett's "Looking to the
Future: The Architecture of Roland Wank," ARRIS 1 (1989): 5-17.
9 Soria linked the cities of the past, the historical centers, with one
another using railway lines . These vast triangulations form the structure
for urban growth because, as Soria reasoned, urbanization would follow
the pattern and direction established by transportation networks.
Similarly, Howard linked his new communities, whose population was
anticipated to be 30,000, with railways which also connected these
communities with the larger cities of the past, separated from one another
by greenbelts held in perpetuity for use in agriculture, forestry, and
recreation . In this sense, Howard's urban structure harkens back to that
prevalent in the middle ages when, because of their size and the proximity
of places of employment or work to places of residence, cities existed in a
symbiotic relationship with their immediate environments, dependent on
their locales for essential food supplies and raw materials.
Superficially, Soria's approach, predicated on large-scale transportation
networks, and Howard's, predicated on an almost medieval model, appear
contradictory. They nevertheless share two important ideas: that a new
structure for urbanization would emerge in the twentieth century and that
this structure would derive from the tools at hand, specifically the new
technology, as represented by railroads, and the possibilities offered by
industrialization.
Garnier's work, exhibited in Paris in 1904 but unpublished until 1917,
is a clear attempt to design an entire "modern" city, predicated on mass
transit, industrialization, and a direct, symbiotic relationship with its
environment . Unlike Howard's schematic "diagrams" for the garden city,
Garnier's proposal included beautifully rendered designs fo.J; . virtually every
building in his proposed community. Not only do his designs embrace and
formally articulate then nascent Modernism, they also present a
completeness of vision and understanding of an approach to solving the
problems of the contemporary city integral with its region. In a physical
sense, Garnier's is a highly accessible model of the holistic approach to
planning, one with which both MacKaye and Wank must have been
familiar .
10
Because of the profound impact the Great Depression had on all
aspects of life, not just its economic impact, such a change in attitude was
clearly accelerated and broadened in scope to include more of this
country's intellectual and political leaders than just the few members of
the Regional Planning Association to whom the work had been originally
directed.
11
A summary of expenses outlined in T.V.A.'s first "annual" report (6
December 1938) covered operations from 16 June 1933 to 30 June 1938,
conveys the magnitude of this undertaking. Fixed assets directly related to
T.V.A. since passage of the enabling legislation were $209,000,000. Of this
amount, $53,000,000 was for land and reservoir-clearance costs;
$70,000,000 for completed dams, including powerhouse equipment;
$15,000,000 for transmission and distribution plants; $3,000,000 for
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fertilizer plants; $60,000,000 for dams and other projects under
construction; and the balance of $8,000,000 for miscellaneous properties
consisting of villages, dwellings, and other structures; construction
equipment, trucks, and automobiles; office furniture and fixtures; and the
cost of preliminary studies and planning applicable to possible future
projects. To these add Wilson Dam, the inventories acquired at Muscle
Shoals, and Wheeler Lock, and the total amount invested was in excess of
$224,000,000.
12 "Every idea has a right physical size, " observed the sculptor Henry
Moore. It is also possible that there is a built-in life span to every idea,
some ideas being longer-lived than others, recognition of this might bring
abovt a new way of thinking about and structuring human activities.
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